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Abstract 
This paper aims to find the extent of Disclosure of Corporate Governance Compliance of State Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) in recent years in Bangladesh. Dichotomous and Partial compliance method are 
used to find out the compliance of corporate governance notification provided by Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Bangladesh Bank (BB) by SOCBs). Annual reports of 2013 for four State 
Owned Commercial Banks one of which is listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) have been used to conduct 
this study. Firstly, 95 disclosure variables from Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
notifications and 73 disclosure variables from Bangladesh Bank (BB) Corporate Governance Guidelines have 
been identified as disclosure variables. Secondly, 95 variables from BSEC have been converted into 7 main 
variables and 73 variables from BB have been converted in to 3 main variables. Then to find compliance status 
of notifications of SOCBs provided by BSEC and BB cross tabulation and descriptive statistics are presented by 
using SPSS. The results of the study conclude that compliance of corporate governance notification by SOCBs in 
Bangladesh is not satisfactory. In case of, disclosure of corporate governance compliance notifications issued by 
BSEC we have found that it is 59% in Dichotomous Approach and 54% in Partial Compliance Approach. In case 
of disclosure of corporate governance notifications issued by BB it is 37% according to Dichotomous Approach 
and 29% in terms of Partial Compliance Approach. It is also found that there is no separate notification based on 
state owned concept for SOCBs in Bangladesh. Lack of corporate governance in SOCBs in Bangladesh is also 
one of the reasons of recent financial scam in SCOBs. This research will be helpful to minimize this sort of scam 
in the banking sectors in countries like Bangladesh. This study will create values not only to those state owned 
commercial bank’s authorities but also to the other stakeholders who are related to banking sector in Bangladesh 
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1.  Introduction 
Contemporary concerns regarding the significance of Corporate Governance in banking sector in Bangladesh 
have put a host of emphasis on corporate governance in banking sector. State Owned Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs) attracts special attention from the people of all walks of life due to their financial scams and 
questionable performances in recent times. Financial sector in Bangladesh consists of banking financial 
institution, non-bank financial institution, private companies, public limited companies and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are one of the largest segments of the economy of Bangladesh. Although the weight of 
SOEs in economic activity varies from country to country, data collected by the World Bank just over a decade 
ago suggest that SOEs accounted for close to 20% of the total non-agricultural economic activities in an average 
low-income developing country (Sultan Balbuena, S. 2014). Corporate governance is not carried out in a vacuum. 
Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises is a major challenge in many economies (OECD 2005). The 
incentives and abilities of owners, intermediaries, board members, managers and stakeholders depend on the 
environment in which they and corporations operate (Isaksson, M. and Çelik S, 2013). In the light of corporate 
financial scandals, there is an ever increasing attention on corporate governance issues (Sekhar Muni Amba). 
The propagation of crises and scandals in recent years, has demonstrated the failure of the governance system 
(Fathi J. 2013). Corporate governance (CG) is a coordinated process of principles, policies, procedures and 
clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities framed to overcome the conflicts of interest inherent in the 
corporate form. So, two major objectives of corporate governance can be to eliminate or mitigate conflicts of 
interest particularly those between management and shareholders and to ensure that the assets of the company 
are used efficiently and productively and in the best interests of its shareholders and other stakeholders. In most 
cases, independent directors can play a vital role but the outside (independent) directors cannot add potential 
value to the firm’s economic performance in Bangladesh (Rashid, A., De Zoysa, A. Lodh, S. and Rudkin, K. 
2010). At a conceptual level, the selection and nomination of board members raises questions about how 
knowledge markets operate: how are candidates with the desired qualifications and experience located by those 
responsible for nominating candidates? (OECD 2012). But in Bangladesh, it essentially revolves around informal 
networks and personal acquaintances, especially of the controlling shareholder and in case of SOCBs, it is 
political figures. There are a lot of ambiguities in the approaches of corporate governance of SOCBs in 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, supervision of banking sector is shared by the Bangladesh Bank (BB), Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) and the banking and financial institution division under the 
Ministry of Finance. BB and BSEC regulate private commercial banks listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
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while the Bangladesh Bank and the banking division under Ministry of Finance look after the eight state-run 
banks, some of which have been plagued by several financial scams in recent times. Though Banking Division of 
Ministry of Finance and Bangladesh Bank monitor and assess performance of SOCBs in Bangladesh in an 
ineffective way, basically there is no specific body to do that, so their activities have so far not been accountable. 
Due to less monitoring and control and ineffectiveness and inefficiency of Board of Directors (BoD) a number of 
financial scams have revealed in recent times in SOCBs. These sort of financial irregularities have put the role of 
SOCBs in question. Unfortunately, investors have little confidence in corporate accounting information in 
Bangladesh (Kabir, Md.Humayon. 2002). That is why, we see that sometimes Bangladesh Bank expresses its 
serious dissatisfaction over the financial irregularities, slow progress in automation of the banks and risk 
management of SOCBs. But due to various political influences and operational inefficiency Bangladesh Bank is 
unable to take any strong initiatives to control those activities. Probably, it is not a good way to regulate the 
banking sector by different authorities with different capacities and capabilities. It is better to have that 
responsibility and authority domiciled within those entities that have the capacity, the people and the mandate to 
get the work done and most countries in the world put the responsibility on the central bank. There are many 
black boxes in Bangladesh to get information, so it is difficult to conduct studies on state run commercial banks. 
Since annual report is only and reliable source of public information of state –owned commercial banks, so 
information have been collected from the annual report for the year of 2008-2013. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Isaksson, M. and S. Çelik (2013) says that there are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate 
governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy intervention. The other is a lack of 
empirical knowledge about the corporate landscape where rules are supposed to be implemented and the 
functioning of today’s equity markets, where voting rights and cash flow rights are traded. Corporate governance 
is defined as the structures and processes by which companies are directed and controlled. Good corporate 
governance helps companies operate more efficiently, mitigate risk and safeguard against mismanagement, and 
improve access to capital that will fuel their growth. Corporate governance also contributes to development. 
Increased access to capital encourages new investments, boosts economic growth, and provides employment 
opportunities (IFC-2013). Corporate governance also implies that the company would manage its affairs with 
diligence, transparency, responsibility, and accountability and would maximize the shareholders wealth (Pandey, 
I.M. 2006). According to the Rossenberg “corporate governance as a blend of law, regulation, enforcement and 
appropriate voluntary practices by companies that permit a company to attract the capital market perform 
efficiently, and generate long term value for its stakeholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and 
society as a whole”(Rossenberg, A. 2002). There is a significant body of theoretical and empirical literature in 
accounting and finance that considers the relation among corporate governance, management turnover, corporate 
performance, corporate capital structure and corporate ownership structure (Bhagat S., and Bolton B., 2008). It 
makes companies more accountable and transparent to investors and gives them the tools to respond to 
stakeholder concerns, including implementation of good environmental and social practices. It also contributes to 
development. Increased access to capital encourages new investments, boosts economic growth, and provides 
employment opportunities. Businesses that operate more efficiently tend to allocate and manage resources more 
sustainably. Better stakeholder relationships help companies address environmental protection, social, and labor 
issues. (key highlights of 2013, International Finance Corporation (IFC). But the challenges in terms of efficient 
policy design manifest themselves at every stage of the investment process  (Isaksson, 2004). 
Sound Corporate Governance (CG) practices are the foundations upon which the trust of investors 
(stakeholders, banks, and nonbank financial institutions) and other stakeholders is built; whereas poor CG 
practices lower the confidence level of a company’s stakeholder, especially that of investors as they are the 
providers of corporate finance and require assurance that their investment will generate reasonable returns and be 
protected (Afroze and Jahan, 2005). One of the principal reasons for poor corporate governance (CG) is that 
most of the listed companies are family oriented (Ahmed and Yusuf, 2005) and in case of SOCB in mostly 
operated by ruling party affiliated people. 
Sekhar Muni Amba examines the impact of corporate governance variables on firms’ financial 
performance. Hasan (2012) makes a comparison between conventional corporate governance system and Islamic 
corporate governance system insisting on the role of ethics as an essential incident on corporate governance. 
Wang et al. (2008) and Agoraki et al. (2010) found that board independence did not have any significant effect 
on bank profitability. The return on average assets (ROAA), bank size and board size values of conventional 
banks was higher compared to Islamic banks (Shaista  and  Gunasegavan, 2013). Basel (2010) has called 
attention to the need to understand the corporate governance of financial entities. Basel advocates a governance 
structure composed of a board of directors and senior management and wanted to deliver a clear message that 
corporate governance can guarantee a sound financial system. 
Governance of an Islamic corporate structure is done in such a way that each person associated with 
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the bank is actually the shareholder to the bank, which implies that success of the bank means success of the 
shareholder (El-Gamal, 2005). But Tamimi, (2012) stated that there is no significant difference in corporate 
governance of Islamic and conventional banks in UAE. Kim et al. (2012) review corporate governance when it 
comes to ownership structure of domestic owned banks. Ownership structure has vital role as it is a key 
determinant of corporate governance. The main purpose of corporate governance is to achieve the organizational 
objectives by understanding the relationship among variables supported by policies and programs which are 
decided by consensus (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). Siddiqui (2010) highlights mainly the model of Corporate 
Governance where main focus was on- what model to measure corporate Governance in Bangladesh is adopted 
and what has influenced to adopt that model.  
Chaudhury et al. (2011) examined the disclosure of different factors of corporate governance for 
certain specific company composing twelve financial institutions, six commercial banks and six developments 
banks. Rehman and Din(2013) investigates the corporate governance issues which cause poor corporate 
governance including inadequate transparency, inefficient boards, insider malpractices, lack of disclose fusion of 
the post of the chairman and that of the managing director and non- separation of ownership from management. 
Sobhan F. and Werner W. (2003) identified areas where reform is needed in Bangladesh and explored successful 
Corporate Governance initiatives and practices in the region investigates the extent to which the Bangladeshi 
listed companies comply with the corporate governance guidelines of BSEC. 
Hasan and Hossain (2012) showed the overall disclosure level is 67% which is not a good score 
because this score does not provide a good signal to the stakeholder. Hasan et al. (2013) assessed the corporate 
governance and financial disclosure on Bangladesh perspectives. This study was done through the analysis of 
annual report of twenty Bangladeshi companies with four different industries, each containing five companies. 
Rahman et al.(2014) conducted a  research that  gives a positive view to all stakeholders who are associated with 
the banks. Their study was an extension of previous study which mainly deals with the Corporate Governance 
disclosure in banking sector. Imam & Malik (2007) examines how corporate governance is practiced through 
ownership structure and how firm’s performance as well as its dividend payout policy is influenced by different 
ownership pattern. 
A study on observation of 274 Bangladeshi firm’s by Rashid et al. (2010) reveal that the outside 
(independent) directors cannot add potential value to the firm’s economic performance in Bangladesh. The idea 
of the introduction of independent directors may have benefits for greater transparency, but the non-
consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural differences in an emerging economy such as 
Bangladesh may not result in economic value addition to the firm. 
 
3. Significance of the Study 
In 2008 the SOCBs were corporatized with the hope that they would function well if they are allowed to work 
independently but we see that their condition did not improve rather deteriorated further. In spite of being a least 
developed country, Bangladesh is running its financial sector with sixty (60) banks among them fifty six (56) 
scheduled and four (4) nonscheduled banks. There is strong relation between economic development and 
corporate governance, based on experiences in many countries, sectors, and business organizations (from state-
owned enterprises to publicly listed companies) (Claessens S. and Yurtoglu B.2012). The four SOCBs have a 
great contribution in shaping the overall economy of Bangladesh.  As these banks are owned by the state, 
political interference is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh, in case of major decisions taken in SOCBs. 
Ultimately, the people of the state bear the consequences of different scams, embezzlements, corruptions, 
mismanagement and irregularities in SOCBs in Bangladesh. Recent scam in banking sector especially in state 
owned banks is the result of lack of proper corporate governance in banking sectors. So it is essential to know 
the status of corporate governance compliance and performance of SOCBs in Bangladesh so that necessary steps 
can be taken to avoid such unexpected situation and dissatisfactory performance. 
Bangladesh Bank (BB) as a central regulatory authority sets rules and regulations about Corporate 
Governance for banking sectors from time to time. In addition to this, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC) sets some rules about the Corporate Governance (in 2006 and amended in 2012) and 
advises the listed company to follow those rules to ensure proper corporate governance.  
Researchers have found out the disclosure of corporate governance (CG) notification by banking 
sectors in Bangladesh, someone has found out the relationship between CG notification compliance and 
performance of banks, someone has researched on shariah supervisory board (SSB) and bank performance and 
someone has found out the difference in corporate governance of conventional and Islamic banks. Almost 
similar type of study has been done by Hasan and Hossain (2012) and (Rahman et al.,2014) where total sample 
number was twenty and thirty respectively for four different industries. But few researchers have researched on 
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Compliance of SOCBs in Bangladesh according to the guidelines provided 
by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Bangladesh Bank (BB). So this research can 
assist to understand the overall corporate governance compliance abided by the SOCBs in Bangladesh. 
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4. Objective of the Study 
The basic objective of the study is to measure the extent of corporate governance compliances of SOCBs in 
Bangladesh. This study will also embark upon the following objectives:  
 To examine the extent to which the SOCBs comply with the corporate governance guidelines provided 
by Bangladesh Security Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Bangladesh Bank (BB). 
 To explore the corporate governance (CG) practices in terms of disclosure in the SOCBs in Bangladesh. 
 To observe the comparative compliances and performances of the four SOCBs 
 To find a prospective solution to those problems faced by SOCBs in the area of corporate governance 
disclosure. 
 
5. Limitations of the Study 
As, there are many black boxes in government sectors of Bangladesh to get information mainly on public sectors, 
so all the data used in this study are collected from the annual report of the concerned banks. In addition to this, 
the bank’s managements are not willing to provide information to carry out research. If data could be collected 
from different sources, the research could produce different results. This study has focused on four state owned 
commercial banks and among them Rupali Bank Limited is enlisted in DSE though there are eight state run 
banks in Bangladesh.  
 
6. Selection of Disclosure Items 
Disclosure items have been selected from the Notifications on Corporate Governance Issued by Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Corporate Governance guidelines issued by Bangladesh Bank 
(BB). 
 
6.1 Sources of data   
The data for this study have been collected from the audited annual financial reports and annual reports for 
the year of 2013.Sources of data used in the study are as follows- 
 Annual Report for all SOCBs in Bangladesh for the year of 2008-2013 
 Circular issued by the Banking Regulation and Policy Department (BRPD) of Bangladesh Bank 
regarding corporate governance 
 Notification Issued by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) and guidelines about 
corporate governance 
 
6.2 Selection of Disclosure Items from BB Circulars 
To ensure good governance i.e. corporate governance in bank management, Bangladesh Bank (BB) issued three 
circulars in 2013 covering three broad areas as follows: 
 BRPD Circular No.11 dated 27 October 2013: Formation and responsibilities of Board of Directors 
(BoD). 
 BRPD Circular Letter No. 18 dated 27 October 2013: Appointment and responsibilities of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). 
 BRPD Circular Letter No. 19 dated 27 October 2013: Contractual appointment of Advisor and 
Consultant. 
The summary of the checklists that each bank complies with the said CG guidelines issued by 
Bangladesh Bank through those circular is as follows: 
Table 1 CG guidelines issued by Bangladesh Bank 
Explanation of disclosure items 
Disclosure of 
Compliance 
Key 
Total 
number of 
disclosure 
items 
Percentage of 
total number 
disclosure 
items 
Formation and Responsibilities of Board of Directors(BoD) FRBD 44 60.27% 
Appointment and Responsibilities of Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
ARCEO 17 23.29% 
Contractual Appointment of Advisor and Consultant CAAC 12 16.44% 
Total Items  73 100% 
From the corporate governance compliance guidelines of BB three (03) disclosure compliance topics 
have been selected for this study. Here, the bold and underlined alphabets of each word represent as a short 
disclosure compliance key form. 
 
6.3 Selection of Disclosure Items from BSEC notifications 
The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) issued Corporate Governance (CG) Guidelines in 
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2012 which is being followed by banks on ‘Comply’ basis. The summary of the checklists that each bank 
complies with the said CG guidelines issued by BSEC through Notification no. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-
158/134/Admin/44 dated 07 August 2012 issued under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969 is as follows: 
Table 2 CG guidelines issued by BSEC 
Explanation of disclosure items 
Disclosure of 
Compliance 
Key 
Total 
number of 
disclosure  
items 
Percentage of 
total number 
disclosure 
items 
Board of Directors BD 45 47.36% 
Chief Financial Officer(CFO), Head of Internal Audit and 
Company Secretary 
CHC 2 2.11% 
Audit Committee AC 28 29.47% 
External/Statutory Auditors  ESA 9 9.47% 
Subsidiary Company SC 5 5.26% 
Duties of Chief  Executive officer(CEO) and Chief Financial 
Officer(CFO) 
DCEFO 4 4.21% 
Reporting and Compliance of Corporate Governance RCC 2 2.12% 
Total Items  95 100% 
From the corporate governance compliance guidelines of BSEC seven (07) disclosure compliance 
topics have been selected for this study. Here, the bold and underlined alphabets of each word represent as a 
short disclosure compliance key form. 
 
7. Methodology of the Study 
This study, about the disclosure of corporate governance compliance of SOCBs in Bangladesh, is design to find 
out the extent of appropriate corporate governance practices of the SOCBs in Bangladesh. All four SOCBs in 
Bangladesh Sonali Bank Limited (SBL), Janata Bank Limited (JBL), Agrani Bank Limited (ABL) and Rupali 
Bank Limited (RBL) have been selected to measure their compliances as per the guidelines provided by BSEC 
and BB. This study has been conducted based on qualitative and quantitative approach. SOCBs in Bangladesh 
are guided basically by BB. BSEC has no notification regarding the SOCBs except RBL which is listed under 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE).Secondary data from the annual report has been used to conduct this study. The 
annual reports of 2008-2013 for each bank were analyzed to conduct this study. This annual reports are mostly 
available in the banks website and at local book market. The information of the annual reports is used to find out 
the compliance of corporate governance by SOCBs in Bangladesh. There are168 disclosure variables, that ensure 
whether a financial company maintains corporate governance notification or not, have been used to conduct the 
study. But it was not enough for the qualitative information. In that case, banks disclosure points were 
considered from the annual reports and consulted with the experts. All the 168 disclosure variables were 
considered equally important. When a company discloses an item in annual report, point “1” is awarded and “0”, 
is awarded when the item does not appear or disclose. First, this data are inputted in SPSS and then whole 168 
variables are converted into 10 main variables such Board of Directors (BOD),Chief Financial Officer &  Head 
of Internal Audit and Company Secretary(CHC),Audit Committee(AC), External/Statutory Auditors not to 
engage in (ESA),Subsidiary Company (SC),  Duties of Chief Executive officer and Chief Financial Officer 
((DCEFO),Reporting &Compliance of Corporate  Governance(RCC),Formation of Board of Directors (FBoD), 
Appointment and responsibilities of Board of Directors (ARCEO) and Contractual appointment of Consultant 
and Advisor (CAAC) considering  the cohesiveness among these variables by using statistical tool SPSS. Then, 
Descriptive statistics are calculated and cross tabulations are prepared by using SPSS. Again these variables are 
analyzed by EXCEL and SPSS to find out the result of Dichotomous Approach and Partial Compliance 
Approach. Initially pros and cons about the existing and relevant corporate governance guidelines in Bangladesh 
have been studied in details and subsequently, their compliances have been measured. Different bi-variant tables 
have been used to observe different factors and their effects. 
Formula of Compliance Index 
There are two types of approach to calculate the compliance of corporate governance and those are- 
 Dichotomous Approach 
 Partial Compliance (PC) Approach 
Dichotomous Approach 
The dichotomous method is an unweighted compliance index whereby an item is scored one if complied, zero if 
not complied or not applicable (NA) if the item is not relevant to the company (Yeoh, 2005; Ali et al., 2004) 
OCI= (Ʃdmi/Ʃdni) 
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Where, d= 1 if an item is Complied and 0 if an item is not Complied 
m= number of item complied 
n= maximum number of Complied items possible 
Partial Compliance (PC) Approach 
Al -Shiab (2003) uses an alternative approach, named the partial compliance method. In case of partial 
compliance approach, unweighted method was used to measure the overall compliance 
PCj= (∑xi/Rj) 
Where, 
PCj= Total compliance score for each company and 0≤PCj≤1. 
Xi= Level of compliance with each part of disclosure requirement. 
I= 1 
Rj= Total number of compliance part of each company. 
Construction of Compliance Index: 
Both the Partial Compliance (PC) Approach and Dichotomous Approach has been used to conduct the study. 
Hasan and Hossain (2012) stated that PC approach shows more accurate result than Dichotomous Approach. 
Suppose there are three sections of compliance P, Q and R. Their possible item to be complied and the ultimate 
complied items are bellow: 
Table 3 Hypothetical data using to show the calculation through PC and Dichotomous method 
Particulars Item can be Complied Complied Item(Case 01) Complied Item(Case 02) 
P 10 9 6 
Q 15 11 9 
R 25 20 25 
Total 50 40 40 
 
The PC and Dichotomous approach for Case 01 will be 
Under PC Approach, 
OCI= (9/10+11/15+20/25)/3=0.81 or 81% 
Under Dichotomous approach 
OCI=40/50= 0.80 or 80% 
Conversely, if the company discloses like Case 02, 
Under PC Approach, 
OCI= (6/10+ 9/15+ 25/25)/3= 0.73 or 73% 
Under Dichotomous approach 
OCI=40/50= 0.80 or 80% 
The PC approach provides more accurate result than Dichotomous Approach. 
 
8.  Findings and Analysis 
8.1 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through dichotomous 
Approach 
According to dichotomous approach Table 4 shows that highest OCI is 78% in the JBL. On the other hand, 
lowest OCI is 33% in SBL. The Overall Compliance Index is 59%. From analysis it is also observed that the 
overall compliance index (OCI) is between 33% to 78%. Here, RBL is in the third position with overall 
compliance of 77%. In case of BD SBL has the lowest compliance showing only 10 compliances out of 45 
compliance issues. On the other hand, RBL has the highest compliance showing 35 compliances out of 45 
compliance issues. In case of CHC, SBL and ABL are not disclosing any issues but JBL and RBL are disclosing 
all issues. In case of AC JBL is disclosing 22 issues out of 28 issues and SBL is disclosing 12 issues only. In 
ESA all the banks are disclosing all issues. In case of, SC only JBL is disclosing 2 issues out of 5 issues no other 
banks are disclosing any issues. In case of DCEFO only JBL and RBL are disclosing all the issues and SBL and 
ABL are not disclosing any issues. In case of RCC we find the same results. The Figure 1 shows the Compliance 
of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through dichotomous Approach. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.20, 2015 
 
14 
Table 4 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through 
Dichotomous Approach 
Serial no 
Company 
key 
Overall compliance analysis through Dichotomous Approach 
    
BD(45) CHC(2) AC(28) ESA(9) SC(5) DCEFO   (4) RCC(2) 
Total 
Compliance
(95) 
OCI 
1 SBL 10 0 12 9 0 0 0 31 0.33 
2 JBL 33 2 22 9 2 4 2 74 0.78 
3 ABL 17 0 21 9 0 0 0 47 0.49 
4 RBL 35 2 21 9 0 4 2 73 0.77 
Individual OCI 0.53 0.50 0.68 1.00 0.10 0.50 0.50   0.59 
 
 
Figure 1 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through 
Dichotomous Approach 
 
8.2 Descriptive Statistics of Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines 
through dichotomous Approach 
Table 5 shows that all SOCBs in Bangladesh do not fully comply with all notifications issued by BSEC 
regarding the Board of directors (BOD), Chief Financial Officer &Head of Internal Audit and Company 
Secretary (CHC), Audit Committee (AC), External/Statutory Auditors not to engage in (ESA), Subsidiary 
Company (SC), Duties of Chief Executive officer and Chief Financial Officer (DCEFO), Reporting & 
Compliance of Corporate Governance (RCC) for the improvement of corporate governance. It shows that BOD 
variable mean is 23.75 and standard deviation is 12.20 that mean compliance regarding board of director 
notifications is varied among different SOCBs in Bangladesh. The above Cross tabulation table indicates that out 
of 4 SOCBs, none of them fully comply with and follow the notifications of BSEC guidelines. Here we have 
found that the highest standard deviation is in the Board of Directors which is 12.20 and standard deviation in 
External Statutory Auditor. In case of total compliance of guidelines of BSEC we have observed the mean of 
total compliance is 56.25 and standard deviation is 20.97 that indicate the compliance disclosure of BSEC 
guidelines is not satisfactory. 
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
Guidelines through Dichotomous Approach 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
Board of Directors 4 25.00 10.00 35.00 23.7500 6.10157 12.20314 148.917 
Chief financial officers 
Head of Internal Audit 
and Company Secretary 
4 2.00 .00 2.00 1.0000 .57735 1.15470 1.333 
Audit Committee 4 10.00 12.00 22.00 19.0000 2.34521 4.69042 22.000 
External Statutory 
Auditor 
4 .00 9.00 9.00 9.0000 .00000 .00000 .000 
Subsidiary Company 4 2.00 .00 2.00 .5000 .50000 1.00000 1.000 
Duties of Chief 
Executive Officer and 
Chief Financial 
Officers 
4 4.00 .00 4.00 2.0000 1.15470 2.30940 5.333 
Reporting and 
Compliance of 
Corporate Governance 
4 2.00 .00 2.00 1.0000 .57735 1.15470 1.333 
Total Compliance 
BSEC 
4 43.00 31.00 74.00 56.2500 10.48312 20.96624 439.583 
Valid N (list wise) 4        
 
8.3 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through PC or partial 
compliance Approach 
Table 6 shows that highest OCI is 85% in the JBL. On the other hand, lowest OCI is 24% in SBL. The OCI of 
ABL and RBL are 30% and 79% respectively. The Overall Compliance Index is 54%. Besides, SOCBs are not 
disclosing all of notifications of BSEC. SOCBs have 100% compliances in case of ESA. More compliance have 
been observed from AC and BD 68% and 53% respectively; while, lowest number of notifications were 
complied in SC which is 10% in terms of partial compliance. Furthermore, the compliance items are CHC (50%) 
and DCEFO (50%) respectively. So, it is clear that SCOBs in Bangladesh is not complying the BSEC’s 
notifications positively. The Figure 2 shows the Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through partial 
compliance Approach. 
Table 6 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through PC or 
Partial Compliance Approach 
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Figure 2 Compliance of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) Guidelines through PC or 
Partial Compliance Approach 
 
8.4 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through dichotomous Approach 
According to dichotomous approach Table 7 shows that highest OCI is 49% in the RBL. On the other hand, 
lowest OCI is 14% in SBL. The Overall Compliance Index is 37%. From analysis it is also observed that the 
overall compliance index (OCI) is between14% to 49%. Here, ABL is in the third position with overall 
compliance of 48%. In case of FBoD SBL has the lowest compliance showing only 5 compliances out of 44 
compliance issues. On the other hand, RBL has the highest compliance showing 27 compliances out of 44 
compliance issues. In case of CAAC, SBL and JBL are not disclosing any issues but ABL and RBL are 
disclosing only one issue. The Figure 3 shows the Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through 
dichotomous Approach. 
Table 7 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through Dichotomous Approach 
Serial no Company key Overall compliance analysis through Dichotomous Approach 
    FBoD   (44) ARCEO  (17) CAAC  (12) Total Compliance   (73) OCI 
1 SBL 5 5 0 10 0.14 
2 JBL 20 6 0 26 0.36 
3 ABL 26 8 1 35 0.48 
4 RBL 27 8 1 36 0.49 
Individual OCI 1.77 1.59 0.17   0.37 
 
Figure 3 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through Dichotomous Approach 
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8.5 Descriptive Statistics of Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through Dichotomous Approach 
Table 8 shows that all SOCBs in Bangladesh do not fully comply with all notifications issued by BB regarding 
the Formation of Board of Directors (FBoD), Appointment and Responsibilities of Board of Directors (ARCEO) 
and Contractual Appointment of Consultant and Adviser (CAAC) for the improvement of corporate governance. 
It shows that FBoD variable mean is 19.50 and standard deviation is 10.14 that mean compliance regarding 
board of director notifications is varied among different SOCBs in Bangladesh. In case of total compliance we 
observe that the mean is 26.75 and the standard deviation is 12.03 that indicate the compliance disclosure of BB 
guidelines is not satisfactory. The above Cross tabulation table indicates that out of 4 SOCBs, none of them fully 
comply with and follow the notifications of BB guidelines in case of FBoD, ARCEO and CAAC. 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics of Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through Dichotomous Approach 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
Formation of Board of 
Directors 
4 22.00 5.00 27.00 19.5000 5.07445 10.14889 103.000 
Appointment and 
Responsibilities of 
Board of Directors 
4 3.00 5.00 8.00 6.7500 .75000 1.50000 2.250 
Contractual 
Appointment of 
Consultant and Adviser 
4 1.00 .00 1.00 .5000 .28868 .57735 .333 
Total Compliance BB 4 26.00 10.00 36.00 26.7500 6.01907 12.03813 144.917 
Valid N (list wise) 4        
 
8.6 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through PC or partial compliance Approach 
Table 9 shows that highest OCI is 39% in the RBL. On the other hand, lowest OCI is 14% in SBL. The OCI of 
ABL and JBL are 38% and 27% respectively. The Overall Compliance Index is 29%. Besides, all SOCBs are not 
disclosing majority of notifications of BB. More compliance from FBoD and ARCEO 44% and 40% 
respectively; while, lowest number of notifications were complied in CAAC which is 4% in terms of partial 
compliance. Furthermore, the second and third compliance items are SC (83%) and BD (92%) respectively. So it 
is clear that SCOBs in Bangladesh are not complying the BB traditional notifications positively. The Figure 4 
shows the Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through partial compliance Approach. 
Table 9 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through PC or Partial Compliance Approach 
Serial no Company key Compliance analysis through PC or Partial Compliance Approach 
    
FBoD 
(44) 
PC(FBoD) 
ARCEO 
(17) 
PC(ARCEO) CAAC (12) PC(CAAC) 
Total 
Compliance  
(73) 
OCI 
1 SBL 5 0.11 5 0.29 0 0.00 0.41 0.14 
2 JBL 20 0.45 6 0.35 0 0.00 0.81 0.27 
3 ABL 26 0.59 8 0.47 1 0.08 1.14 0.38 
4 RBL 27 0.61 8 0.47 1 0.08 1.17 0.39 
Individual OCI   0.44   0.40   0.04 0.88 0.29 
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Figure 4 Compliance of Bangladesh Bank Guidelines through PC or Partial compliance Approach 
 
9. Recommendations and Suggested Guidelines for better Corporate Governance Compliance 
From this study, it is found that compliance of corporate governance notification issued from Bangladesh 
Securities & Exchange Commission (BSEC) and Bangladesh Bank (BB) by SOCBs in Bangladesh is not 
satisfactory. There is no clear indication of compliance according to BSEC and BB guidelines because in BSEC 
and BB notification guidelines for SOCBs are specifically not available. Compliances are not only appropriate 
but also it is essential. Management should take reasonable steps to develop, implement and maintain an 
effective legal compliance program, and the board should be knowledgeable about and oversee the program, 
including periodically reviewing the program to gain reasonable assurance that it is effective in deterring and 
preventing misconduct. Corporations have an important perspective to contribute to the public policy dialogue 
and should be actively involved in discussions about the development, enactment and revision of the laws and 
regulations that affect their businesses and the communities in which they operate and their employees reside. To 
the extent that the corporation engages in political activities, the board should have oversight responsibility and 
consider whether to adopt a policy on disclosure of these activities (BRT, 2012). 
Since all of the SOCBs in Bangladesh are owned by government, in this study it is revealed that 
SOCBs are not so much careful to maintain the appropriate corporate governance practice. Most of the decisions 
are influenced by the ruling part law makers so there is huge chance of corruption and in recent times we have 
found some incidents in state owned commercial banks in Bangladesh. So such types of practice should be 
avoided and governance should be taken at the heart of Bangladesh’s development strategy like other regional 
countries. 
In addition to this on the basis of our analysis in the context of Bangladesh, we recommend some 
guidelines separately for Bank’s Management and Regulatory Authority for efficient management of the practice 
and disclosure of corporate governance in SOCBs in Bangladesh. 
A. Suggestions for Bank’s Management 
a) There should be formal written guidelines specially for corporate governance and its impact by stating 
the goals and strategies; 
b) SOCBs should give more attention  specially proportion of Independent director, vacancy requirement 
of Independent director, reporting extra gain/loss, utilization of proceeds from public issues, 
explanation regarding IPO an RPO, significance variation of quarterly financial statement and annual 
financial statement, reason of non-declaration of dividend etc. 
c) SOCBs should give attention on Audit committee section. In addition to this they should emphasize on 
casual vacancy requirement, review of proceeds from public issues, reporting to shareholders and 
commission about any fraud, conflict of interest and other matters. Though they said in annual report 
these factors are not applicable actually some of these factors exist in banks. 
d) Information and communication Technology (ICT) should be applied to improve the corporate 
governance in Bangladesh that will enhance the transparency and accountability in SOCBs. 
e) SOCBs should give attention on subsidiary company section because in this section their compliance 
rate is very low. They should emphasize on proportion of independent directors in BoD of subsidiary 
company. 
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f) SOCBs, like all other companies, must act within the law. The penalties for serious violations of law 
can be extremely severe, even life-threatening, for corporations. 
g) Internal control structure should be developed in such way so that compliance with the prescribed 
policies and guidelines are confirmed;  
h) Procedures should be in place to ensure that operations are consistent with written policies. As such it is 
essential that a system of controls should be in place to limit malpractice of corporate governance under 
control; 
i) Bank should develop stringent policy for measuring the practice of corporate governance and should 
place in operation to follow strictly and consistently; 
j) Role of the internal audit can be strengthen specially to review the corporate  governance risks and 
should have defined reporting systems; 
k) Management should disclose voluntarily their perceptions and measures taken regarding of corporate 
governance risks exposure and its management; 
l) Last but not least, BODs should not provide mere lip services rather make it happen consistently 
throughout the Bank.  
B. Suggestions for Regulatory Authorities 
Regulatory bodies have very good role for stabilization of this industry and uplifting public confidence. Hence 
following supervisory and regulatory measures could be taken by the Central bank (BB) and other regulatory 
bodies (BSEC) for proper management of corporate governance: 
a) Bangladesh Bank should develop uniform guidelines for SOCBs by mentioning limits for various 
activities along with the procedures to improve the practice of corporate governance in SOCBs in 
Bangladesh;  
b) Bangladesh Securities Exchange commission (BSEC) should develop guideline on the basis of state 
owned concept guidelines so that people easily can distinguish between them. 
c) Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for State-Owned Commercial Banks.  
d) The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-playing field in 
markets where state-owned enterprises and private sector companies compete in order to avoid market 
distortions. The framework should build on, and be fully compatible with, the BSEC and BB Principles 
of Corporate Governance. 
e) Governments should strive to simplify and streamline the operational practices and the legal form under 
which SOCBs operate. Their legal form should allow creditors to press their claims and to initiate 
insolvency procedures. 
f) SOCBs should not be exempt from the application of general laws and regulations. Stakeholders, 
including competitors, should have access to efficient redress and an even-handed ruling when they 
consider that their rights have been violated. 
g) SOCBs should face competitive conditions regarding access to finance. Their relations with state-
owned banks, state-owned financial institutions and other state-owned companies should be based on 
purely commercial grounds. 
h) Establishing well-structured and transparent board nomination processes in fully or majority owned 
SOCBs, and actively participating in the nomination of all SOCBs’ boards. 
i) Ensuring that remuneration schemes for SOCB board members foster the long term interest of the 
company and can attract and motivate qualified professionals. 
 
10. Conclusion 
Effective corporate governance requires a clear understanding of the respective roles of the board, management 
and shareholders, their relationship with each other and with others who have an interest in the corporation and 
its well-being. The relationships of the board and management with shareholders should be characterized by 
transparency and appropriate engagement; their relationships with employees should be characterized by fairness; 
their relationships with the communities, in which they operate, should be characterized by good citizenship; and 
their relationships with government should be characterized by a commitment to compliance(BRT,2012).The 
importance of corporate governance notification compliance is increasing day by day in corporate sector in 
Bangladesh and the compliance by SOCBs in Bangladesh is growing as well. Though, some recent cases show 
lack in compliances of corporate governance in Bangladeshi companies which causes trouble in financial sectors. 
SOCBs are holding the major portions of those financial scams of recent times. As a result, most of the SOCBs 
are being positively encouraged to ensure sound corporate governance within their organization that ultimately 
leading to make a good environment in the financial sector of Bangladesh. The major results of this research 
provide an initial overview of compliance status of corporate governance by SOCBs in Bangladesh. The results 
revealed unsatisfactory compliance of corporate governance notification by SOCBs in Bangladesh. This research 
also gives a view to all stakeholders who are associated with SOCBs. Appropriate and adequate adoption of 
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corporate governance principles by state owned commercial in Bangladesh will be a major step towards creating 
safeguards against corruption, embezzlements and mismanagement and promoting transparency in corporate 
sector in Bangladesh and attracting domestic and foreign investment. In addition to this our separate suggestions 
for the Bank Management and the Regulatory Bodies may assist them to formulate a comprehensive guideline 
and ensure better corporate governance   compliance in SOCBs in Bangladesh. 
Future Research: Future research may focus on the effect of corporate-governance compliance on the 
performance of SOCBs. Application of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the improvement 
of Corporate Governance might be another emerging area of research. At the beginning of the 21st, many of 
Bangladeshi banks have opened different windows along with their conventional banking; thus the comparison 
of corporate governance notification by SOCBs and conventional banks with different windows could be another 
rich area of research. 
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